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JUDICIAL DISCRETION, OR THE SELF
ON THE SHELF
Richard Weisberg*
For the better part of two decades, law has been dominated by
the rhetoric of ethical and moral relativism. Leading legal academi
cians, practitioners, and judges—many of them heavily influenced by
the social sciences—have rendered talk of "values" either irrelevant
or laughable. Yet at the same time, the most conservative among
them have managed to mask a strong moralistic outlook under the
guise of value "neutrality" or its progeny: economic analysis and con
stitutional "originalism." The ascendency of liberals, who for the
four prior decades had stamped our law, has diminished. Unable to
employ cogently the seeming neutrality of the social sciences, they
have abandoned the struggle and watched, bemused, as conservative
theories overtook the classroom and the courthouse.
Since the early 1970's, a political period of decreasing activism
and onrushing apathy, our legal vocabulary has progressively lost its
ethical flavor. Absolutes or near absolutes have been reduced to bal
ancing acts. Everything is negotiable in today's legal climate, and all
legal actors are to some extent held hostage to our fear of idealism.'
We hesitate to call one outcome good or another bad unless these
judgments relate to the seemingly "impersonal" structures of market
efficiency or empirical data. We have lost faith in our native or
trained intuition about justice. The most interesting aspect of a legal
situation is no longer its potential role as a new sentence or paragraph
in the continuing story of a just society;^ rather, each such case is
judged in terms of market forces, balancing tests, or seemingly dispas
sionate modes of statutory or constitutional interpretation.
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. B.A.,
1965, Brandeis University; M.A. (French Literature), 1967; Ph.D. (Comparative Literature),
1970, Cornell University; J.D., 1974, Columbia University. Former Assistant Professor of
French and Comparative Literature, University of Chicago (1971-75). The text of this article
is taken from Professor Weisberg's keynote speech at the Conference of New York Civil Court
Judges in Ellenville, N.Y., October 1987.
1 By "idealism," I mean the positing of a norm toward which the self or the system is
striving. While this is not the forum for a thorough discussion of the now fashionable attack
on idealism (sometimes called "foundationalism," "essentialism," or "necessarianism"), suffice
it to say that anti-idealism is, of course, also merely an idealism. See Weisberg, On the Use and
Abuse of Nietzsche for Modem Constitutional Theory, in Interpreting Law and Literature (S.
Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. forthcoming 1988).
2 But see for a powerful counter-thrust, R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
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The change in metaphor—^from continuing story to hard-nosed
data—has appealed to the times. As novels and histories, with their
intricate plots and large casts of characters, gave way to television and
film, with their limited demands on attention; as social activism sur
rendered to glib skepticism—legal intellectuals caved in under the
shift from complex story to economically efficient machine. For a
long time, co-extensive with the turn to social science, no one was
reading fiction.^ Where was the incentive, or the source, to strive to
understand law as a complex mix of linguistic and human factors?
The demand curve, with its seductive simplicity, replaced Martin Lu
ther King's "arch of the moral universe." If the latter swimg frustratingly wide in its bend toward justice, free market economics seemed
to strike home every single time. But in the process, "justice" lost
some of its rich flavor.
Discussion of the most sensitive areas of law has been character
ized by blandness instead of fervor. Market forces and contractual
principles regulate the commercial transfer of human babies. The
presumption of innocence quietly disintegrates as bail requests are
"balanced" against the general social welfare. Prominent scholars
and some courts suggest that art and literature no longer deserve the
speech protections afforded newspapers and politicians. For these
analysts, even the first amendment may be subject to market analy
sis—does not each extension of first amendment rights inevitably
cheapen those that already exist, they ask. If comparative negligence
statutes have mitigated the harsh common law treatment of negligent
plaintiffs, the economists are there to assure us that the statutes are
inefficient. If, analogously, the ninth amendment appears to safe
guard individuals certain otherwise unspecified rights, some are there
to remind us that, at least in terms of what they call "original intent,"
the amendment is a dead letter.
These two influential forces—economic analysis and originalist
interpretive theory—come together in the fascinating case of Robert
Bork. It is, after all, this provocative scholar, politician, and judge
who recently revealed that he had undergone a "conversion" from
sloppy moralism to scientific economic theory while studying at the
University of Chicago Law School. But what if Chicago theory, like
most theory, is itself value laden, every bit as much part of a philoso
phy—an interpretive scan on the story of the law—^as the liberal judi
cial philosophy now in decline?
Bork's own religious metaphor—his "conversion"—^speaks vol3 Id. But see infra note 36.
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umes. Yet, even under the often brilliant, and always serious, interro
gation by the Senate Judiciary Committee, his imagery was never en
gaged. Only by implication, under astoundingly strong questioning
one Saturday by Senator (or is it Professor?) Arlen Spector, was it
suggested that Bork's "originalism" cloaked a full-fledged value sys
tem under the mantle of a judicious inquiry into the values of the
framers. How better to write himself into the Constitution than to
pretend he had simply ascertained the thoughts of men who created
language 200 years ago? How better to regulate society according to
his new religion than to pick and choose from among congressional
statements on the Sherman Antitrust Act? "Original intent," as so
understood, emerged less as a scientific constraint upon judges than as
yet another means to institutionalize Bork's own values—^his own
"conversion." How else could he have concluded in a judicial opin
ion^ that Senator Sherman had in mind late twentieth-century Chi
cago views of market efficiency, those views which, of course, were
precisely his own?
In an address before the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Justice William Brennan recently reminded us "that
judges inevitably confront value choices."' He recalled for us the ex
ample of Judge Cardozo, who had "rejected the [then] prevailing
myth that a judge's personal values were irrelevant to the decision
process, because a judge's role was presumably limited to application
of the existing law, a process governed by external, objective norms."®
"Cardozo," Justice Brennan continued, "acknowledged that judges,
like common mortals, cannot divorce themselves completely from
their personal, subjective vision."' Indeed, as Justice Brennan put it,
"The Judicial branch [itself had been] bom not on the lofty peaks of
pure reason, but in the trenches of partisan politics."® Today, Justice
Brennan observed, "the greatest threat to due process principles is
formal reason severed from the insights of passion."® "If due process
values are to be preserved in the bureaucratic state of the late twenti
eth century, it may be essential that officials possess passion—the
same passion that puts them in touch with the dreams and disappoint
ments of those with whom they deal.'"°
* Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
' Reprinted in Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 3, 4 (1988).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 17.
10 Id. at 19.
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I would diflFer slightly from Justice Brennan on only two parts of
his timely and eloquent address. First, I believe that judges, as much
as the bureaucrats he stressed, today risk a dissociation from those
whose lives they must regulate. Second, and more important perhaps,
I would contend that impersonality is as much a "passion" as any
thing else. Borkean originalism, indeed Bork's inability to find pri
vacy, or even the ninth amendment in the Constitution, amounts as
much to subjective value imposition as does the behavior of the most
"activist" judge.
As in some other periods of jurisprudential impasse, so today, we
need a Cardozo—or a Brennan—to point out not so much the
favorability as the inevitability of personal values in adjudication. In
Cardozo's words, judges "do not stand aloof on these chill and distant
heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and sp>eaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by."" In all
of his extrajudicial essays, Cardozo stresses to a formalistically at
tuned audience the necessary place of subjectivism when judges act.
But perhaps more strikingly still, Cardozo practiced on the bench
what he preached in his essays. Occasionally, and assisted by that
incredible gift of poetic expression, Cardozo risked seeming "injudi
cious" by overlooking precedents and challenging accepted norms on
no more authority than that afforded by his formidable value system
alone. I submit that he succeeded in large measure because his forth
right value-laden approach eventually impressed his appellate col
leagues and the rest of the legal world as being fully appropriate to the
judge's job. Since Solomon, our best judges have scrutinized and then
embraced their values and unabashedly applied them to the case at
hand.
I have earlier written about Cardozo's four methods of adjudica
tion," the last of which—"culture"—called on the judge to seek the
best of himself or herself in deciding difficult matters. Also in other
arenas, I have analyzed the importance of writing skills to Cardozo's
success, using the opinion mHynes v. New York Central Railroad " as
a principal example. I use the same opinion to exemplify the theme of
unabashed value seeking, and to prove that Cardozo saw calling on
his own values not only as a good but as an inevitable aspect of adju
dication. Harvey Hynes, a "lad of 16," was electrocuted by the rail" B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921).
12 See Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 283
(1979).
13 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921). See R. Weisberg, When Uwyers Write 7-12 (1987).
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road's carelessly maintained wires as he stood "poised for his dive"
into the waters of the Harlem River. But Harvey, technically, was a
trespasser; the horizontal extension of the railroad's property embod
ied in the plank from which he, and other "boys of the neighbor
hood," dove robbed him of the protective duty of care otherwise owed
by the railroad. Here legal formalism collided with "that realistic jus
tice" that Cardozo espoused. Without citing a single precedent—his
sole authority is a law review article by Roscoe Pound'^—Cardozo
strikes out at a system of values opposed to his own, and he challenges
that system forthrightly and controversially:
Thus far the courts have held that Hynes at the end of the spring
board above the public waters was a trespasser on the defendant's
land. They have thought it immaterial that the board itself was a
trespass, an encroachment on the public ways. They have thought
it of no significance that Hynes would have met the same fate if he
had been below the board and not above it. The board, they have
said, was annexed to the defendant's bulkhead. . . . [T]o bathers
diving from the springboard, there was no duty, we are told, unless
the injury was the product of mere willfulness or wantonness, no
duty of active vigilance to safeguard the impending structure.
Without wrong to them, crossarms might be left to rot; wires
highly charged with electricity might sweep them from their stand,
and bury them in the subjacent waters. In climbing on the board,
they became trespassers and outlaws. The conclusion is defended
with much subtlety of reasoning, with much insistence upon its
inevitableness as a merely logical deduction. A majority of the
court are unable to accept it as the conclusion of the law.''

Cardozo describes here a battle not of humanity versus logic. In
stead, he asserts that both approaches are value oriented. The lesson
of these lines does not require us to think of Cardozo as a plaintifforiented judge countering the abstract, propertied rules of the courts
below.'® The depersonalized "they"—as Cardozo consistently calls
the courts below—have tried valiantly to tell "us" that their approach
is correct. Formalism does not thereby stand apart from value asser
tion—it is merely a means (like Bork's originalism) to the end of en
forcing the torts rule against the equally forceful argument that the
boy was still "in the enjoyment of the public waters" when the trag
edy occurred. Cardozo chastises the courts not for forgetting themHynes, 231 N.Y. at 235, 131 N.E. at 900 (citing Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
Colum. L. Rev. 605, 608, 610 (1908)).
15 Id. at 232-33, 131 N.E. at 899.
1® Indeed, in Palsgraf versus that other railroad—the LIRR—Cardozo insisted equally as
strongly that the defendant should have prevailed below. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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selves behind a rule but for permitting the rule to become themselves;
"[r]ights and duties in systems of living law are not built upon such
quicksands.'"^
Rhetorically at the climax of this stunning opinion, these words
focus on what Justice Brennan would call the "passion" of the courts
below. "They" have passionately insisted that their "dryly logical ex
treme"—Pound's phrase, cited here by Cardozo—represents law.
Cardozo mitigates their passion by showing that it only represented
intuition:
Here structures and ways are so united and commingled, superim
posed upon each other, that the fields are brought together. In
such circumstances, there is little help in pursuing general maxims
to ultimate conclusions. They have been framed alio intuitu. They
must be reformulated and readapted to meet exceptional condi
tions. Rules appropriate to spheres which are conceived of as sepa
rate and distinct cannot, both, be enforced when the spheres
become concentric. There must then be readjustment or
collision.'®

Brilliantly rendered, this thought deliberately reinvokes the horrible
fact pattern of the Hynes tragedy. Just as man-made wires collided
with youthful flesh and blood, so man-made rules of law have been
permitted to strike and destroy other man-made rules. But "[t]he law
must say whether it will subject [Hynes] to the rule of the one field or
of the other, of this sphere or of that.'"'
At every point along the circle, human beings strive to impose
their views on others. The judicial act, for Cardozo, heightens—it
cannot hide—this all too human reality. Passion must occasionally be
met with passion, and we would err badly to assume that passion has
been overcome by the mere donning of judicial robes.
In any but an age proud of its value neutrality, as Justice Bren
nan observed, "[wjith all respect to Cardozo, there would have been
little in his account of the nature of the judicial process that would
have struck" us as "remarkable."^® But for judges today, "although
Cardozo's insights have taken deep root, they have yet to displace
completely what might be called the myth of judge-as-oracle."^' With
this in mind, I recently asked my "Law and Literature" class to com
pare the Hynes opinion with one written by a supposed exemplar of
precedential and logical precision, our present Chief Justice. The case
17
18
19
20
21

231 N.Y. at 233, 131 N.E. at 899.
Id. at 235-36, 131 N.E. at 900.
Id. at 236, 131 N.E. at 900.
Brennan, supra note 5, at 7.
Id. at 5.
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was Paul V. Davis,a suit brought by a private individual for the
vindication of his alleged right to liberty under the fourteenth amend
ment and other rights he thought granted him under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. Davis found his name and mug shot publicized
by the local police under the rubric of "shoplifter" for all to see in his
hometown community. He had been arrested, but never arraigned or
indicted, under that charge. He felt that the state, acting through its
police, had deprived him of those rights.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a divided Court, felt differently.
But was that his feeling, or was it rather a result compelled by the
texts and precedents? My students pointed out that Rehnquist, unlike
Cardozo, cited earlier cases ad nauseam. They described his style as
less literary than compendious. He was more the professor than the
poet. His conclusions arose as though dictated by an inexorable logic.
Whatever our stance as to the conclusion reached here by Rehnquist,
my students went on, we must admire his lucidity, his "science"—the
modem judge par excellence.
Others in the classroom, especially those who had become sensi
tized to the workings of language and structure within the judicial
opinion, refused to see Rehnquist as scientific and dispassionate.
They pointed out not only the often persuasive dissent of Justice
Brennan but also indicia of subjectivism within Rehnquist's seemingly
value-neutral prose. The differences between Cardozo and Rehnquist
began to disintegrate quickly, as these students called on us to read
closely Rehnquist's opening gambit:
Petitioner Paul is the Chief of Police of the Louisville, Ky., Divi
sion of Police, while petitioner McDaniel occupies the same posi
tion in the JeflFerson County, Ky., Division of Police. In late 1972
they agreed to combine their efforts for the purpose of alerting lo
cal area merchants to possible shoplifters who might be operating
during the Christmas season. In early December petitioners dis
tributed to approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metro
politan area a "flyer".. . [of active shoplifters]. The flyer consisted
of five pages of "mug shot" photos, arranged alphabetically. ... In
approximately the center of page 2 there appeared photos and the
name of the respondent, Edward Charles Davis III.^^

Just as Cardozo had humanized Harvey Hynes to begin his
tragic tale, so Rehnquist starts this story by highlighting the police
officer defendants whose interests he goes on to safeguard. Plaintiff
Davis and his grievance must tarry a score of lines before surfacing.
22 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
23 Id. at 694-95.
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By then, Rehnquist's reader has assimilated a pleasant picture of two
dutiful officers—as much this tale's protagonists as the "lad of 16"
was Cardozo's—endeavoring to safeguard the serenity of the Christ
mas season against potential riffraff.
Rhetoric and fact deneutralization of this kind, we are learning,
are endemic to the judicial act—certainly in difficult cases, perhaps
universally. Judges employ the tools of language and organization—
Cardozo's "architectonics"^^—not to manipulate readers but to be
stow the aura of correctness upon their often value-directed conclu
sions. Thus Justice Rehnquist, ever mindful of the limitations he
believes restrict federal court jurisdiction, introduces respondent Da
vis only to chastise him:
Concededly if the same allegations had been made about respon
dent by a private individual, he would have nothing more than a
claim for defamation imder state law. But, he contends, since peti
tioners are respectively an official of city and of county govern
ment, his action is thereby transmuted into one for deprivation by
the State of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.^'
The adverb "concededly" and the verb "transmuted" subtly guide us
into the passionate judge's value system. There is no need for prece
dent here. The plaintiff's choice of a federal court forum immediately
marks him off as aberrational, for even he seems (through Rehnquist's
prose) to have "conceded" that he has at best a common-law defama
tion action here. Rehnquist's architectonics succeeds in ridiculing the
plaintiff's very choice of a federal court forum; such a suit, if permit
ted, "would come as a great surprise to those who drafted and
shepherded the adoption of [the 14th] Amendment."^® The plaintiff
thus has been excluded, through structure, from the universe of both
law-abiding Christmas shoppers and our constitutional heritage. Like
the Martian the verb conjures, plaintiff Davis cannot be permitted to
"transmute" these heritages into self-serving litigation.
By the time, then, that Rehnquist arrives at the operative prece
dents, techniques anything but neutral have worked their will upon
many readers—^perhaps even upon a majority of his Court colleagues.
It so happens that there is a Supreme Court case that, on its terms,
would clearly thrust Davis' fact pattern into the sphere of fourteenth
amendment protection. The case is Wisconsin v. Constantineau,^'^ and
the language is as follows: "Yet certainly where the State attaches a
24 Cardozo, Law and Literature, The Yale Review (1925), reprinted in Selected Writings of
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 352 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
25 424 U.S. at 698.
26 Id. at 699.
22 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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'badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play. . . .
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential."^® In Constantineau, the police
chief of Hartford, Wisconsin "posted" the plaintiff's name on all re
tail liquor outlets, banning sale to her of alcohol under the challenged
state statute. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, had no trouble
with the State's regulation of alcoholism and its eflFect in some cases
on families and public order. However, in language not quoted by
Rehnquist in Paul v. Davis, he stated: "The only issue present here is
whether the label or characterization given a person by 'posting,'
though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
Justice Douglas held the statute uncon
stitutional for failure to provide such opportunity and notice. A sub
sequent case. Board of Regents v. Roth,^° found the Supreme Court
following Douglas' decision in an analogous situation.
Rehnquist, reputedly the master of judicial logic, avoids the most
lucid reading of these precedents—^that defamation produced by the
state may be a violation of a protected constitutional interest. In
stead, he reads the precedents to require both a defamatory utterance
and a retraction by the state of a previously retained right—^in Con
stantineau, the right to purchase liquor, in Roth the right to retain
one's job. Since Davis lost nothing except his reputation by being
branded as a shoplifter, the precedents are deemed inapposite.
The distinction between Cardozo and Rehnquist has become less
pronounced. Neither felt bound, in cases they found provocative, to
follow precedent closely. Brilliant jurists of quite differing stripes,
these two largely relied in such cases on their trained intuition of a
just outcome. They then integrated and refined that intuition into an
act of craftmanship, the opinion itself. In both jurists, value assertion
overrides the merely technical, logical, or even precedential aspects of
their approach. And, although both were writing for courts of ulti
mate jurisdiction, their lesson seems equally as applicable to the trial
court judges who are the immediate audience for these remarks.
Can trial court judges also implement their deepest values? Can
you, in the terms of my title, find the self that is as much on your shelf
as are the statute books and reporters? Or is that volume, the volume
containing your own intuitions, your own culture, closed to you when
28 Id. at 437.
29 Id. at 436.
30 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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you are on the bench? Are not trial court judges bound by precedent,
are they not more constrained, less free? Some may answer "yes" to
these questions. More important, and I think more troublingly, some
may relish the opportunity they think they have to keep themselves
out of the equation of justice.
Freedom, however, cannot be avoided. It may be that the kinds
of decisions fact-finding judges make require a more finely honed intu
ition, a deeper, if less frequently analyzed, position about human be
ings: their needs, their credibility, their direct relationship with our
system of law. The ivory tower of the appellate bench has shielded
some from the clash of personalities and politics that no trial-level
judge can ignore. Many think this distancing from human realities is
Professor—then appellate judge—Robert Bork's real weakness as a
constitutional theorist. I would surmise that adjudication on the level
of original jurisdiction must call into play all of the judge's education,
experience in life, and contextual sensitivity—^his or her full range of
values.
But even if the everyday practice of judging might dull the pas
sions, or more likely emphasize the technical or bureaucratic aspects
of the job, specific kinds of situations suddenly reawaken the Solo
monic yearnings of all good judges. It then turns out that, like a
Judge Cardozo, a civil court judge, too, may work within the system
to effectuate a vision of justice.
Two cases briefly serve as examples. Judge Shirley Levittan, an
acting Supreme Court jurist in New York County, was petitioned by a
man dying of AIDS and accused of second degree robbery. Richard
Williams, the accused, had at most two years to live, probably less.
Williams asked that the indictment be dismissed; the People insisted
that he be brought to trial.^' Surely in this situation, a series of highly
subjective impulses affected the judge. As a technician, she would
have had little trouble denying the petition. There was no law specifi
cally helpful to the petitioner, and there was some risk—expressed by
the People—that a bad precedent would be set in dismissing the in
dictment. No power group stood behind the petitioner, and no law
directly on point came to his assistance. It was simply the judge,
alone and staring into the volume of her being—her self on the shelf.
There, and with the help of CPL 210.40(l)-^although she had to dis
tinguish the closest case under that provision from the Williams
facts—the judge found her answer:
The circumstances of this particular case are such that the sole
31 People V. Williams, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 12, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1987).
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result of a dismissal would be that Richard Williams, who is fatally
ill (a fact which the People do not dispute), would not have to die
in custody. To hold otherwise would mean that the last days of a
man's life would be spent strapped to a bed and under guard.... It
is extremely unlikely that if this indictment is dismissed he will
ever be able to walk the streets again, let alone commit new crimes
to support his drug habit. In the past the defendant's drug addic
tion led him to commit crimes—it is now the cause of a disease the
result of which is tantamount to a sentence more severe than any
court could impose for the crime charged.... Despite the protesta
tions of the People, the . . . [case of] Richard Williams would not
serve as a precedent for future abuses. It is truly a case which
stands on its own facts—a man who, because of an illness, cannot
be justly tried in our system. . . . Rather than force this man to
remain in what amounts to legal limbo awaiting his death, justice
dictates that dismissal of this indictment is the only remedy for this
case. I am convinced that the public's confidence in our criminal
justice system can only be strengthened by such a demonstration of
compassion, especially since in no way does the defendant now
constitute a criminal threat to the community. Even if a man has
not lived with dignity, our society's own self-respect demands that
he be permitted to die in dignity. This shall constitute the decision
and order of this court.
By coincidence, this decision was reported in the same mid-Sep
tember issue of the New York Law Journal that recounted the speech
of Justice Brennan. Justice Brennan and his own point of reference in
that speech. Judge Cardozo, would have smiled upon this show of
value assertion. Particularly noteworthy, perhaps, is the judge's will
ingness, without any legalistic authority for the proposition, to declare
her own values; her chosen result is deemed inevitable not because of
precedent but because of what any trained intuition would find conso
nant with justice.
Less dramatic perhaps, but equally as relevant and moving, is the
1977 opinion of Judge Herbert Posner in the Civil Court of Queens
deciding a case called TKU-Queens Corp. v. Mabel Food Corp.^^ The
latter, a "ma and pa" restaurant, could not meet its final payment
under an agreement to which it had stipulated several months earlier.
Mabel Food petitioned to stay an eviction order filed with the city
marshal by TKU-Queens, its creditor-landlord, but those technicali
ties first had to be siphoned through the judge's sense of fairness. No
table in the opinion are Judge Posner's frequent citations to literature.
32 Id. at 13, col. 1.
33 90 Misc. 2d 48, 393 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1977).
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an authority system that used to be integral with law and is now re
turning to fashion.
"Is there a place for 'Mercy' in the civil courts of this state?"—
the judge asks in opening; he then proceeds:
or does justice require the judge to observe the strict letter of the
law under all circumstances? As Portia stated, in possibly the bestknown passage in all of Shakespeare's plays: "The quality of mercy
is not strained, it droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the
place beneath. It is twice blest-it blesseth him that gives and him
that takes. 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes the throned
monarch better than his crown. His sceptre shows the force of
temporal power, the attribute to awe and majesty; wherein doth sit
the dread and fear of kings; but mercy is above this sceptred sway.
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings; It is an attribute to God
himself; and earthly power doth then show likest God's—^when
mercy seasons justice."^^
Petitioners—need it be added—were granted their stay.
This last opinion, which along the way has recourse to Robert
Bums as well as Shakespeare, relies more heavily on literature than
on the traditional precedents, one of which had to be distinguished
forcefully. Judge Herbert Posner's willingness to use the cultural
sources available to him would have pleased Cardozo, who always
argued that judges should draw on the best wisdom available to help
decide a case. In an address fifty-five years ago to the New York State
Bar Association, Cardozo declared:
Now, personally, I prefer to give the label law to a much larger
assembly of social facts than would have that label affixed to them
[even] by the neo-realists. I find lying around loose, and ready to
be embodied into a judgment according to some process of selec
tion to be practiced by a judge, a vast conglomeration of principles
and customs and usages and moralities. If these are so established
as to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that they will
have the backing of the courts in the event that their authority is
challenged, I say they are the law.^'
Cardozo, whose own education was in literature and philosophy,
constantly enriched the volume of self by reading and reflecting over a
wide range of subjects. The self was not to be left on the shelf, gather
ing dust. It was to be edited, amended, improved. New chapters were
to be added and old ones retained on the standard not of inertia but of
their value for the whole developing volume.
Id. at 48, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (judge's punctuation).
3' B. Cardozo, Address to N.Y. State Bar Association (Jan. 22, 1932), reprinted in Selected
Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, supra note 24, at 18.
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Indeed, if we can and should express our values fully in the prac
tice of law, how are we to recognize and then constantly self-criticize
those values? Not all of us have the background of a Cardozo, and
fewer and fewer lawyers receive the kind of enriched education he had
in college and even law school. As to this betterment of the volume of
the self, it must truly be said nowadays, "they don't teach that in law
school." Our failure as educators to enliven and challenge the value
systems of our students has undoubtedly contributed to the increasing
inability of fledgling lawyers to know right from wrong in the practice
of their craft. But it is never too late to scrutinize the self.
Education is the first step into value awareness. Law schools
must begin to reform their curricula. By this I do not mean that law
schools can or should seek to inculcate the most basic values. But
there is ample time during those often redundant three years to insist
that students become aware of their own values and of the place of
those values in their professional lives. As legal educators are increas
ingly recognizing, the primary jurisprudential source for the under
standing of professional and personal ethics is literary art.'®
Education along these lines should continue for practitioners and
forjudges. A suggestion I would offer on this occasion for taking the
self off" the shelf, brushing it up a bit, and making it as relevant to
practicing law and judging as the printed volumes it competes with, is
a simple one. Read one law-related piece of fiction each month."
Then organize groups to discuss each of the works and their relevance
36 The field of Law and Literature, virtually a wilderness fifteen years ago, now has become
a viable territory, with its own metes and bounds. See, e.g., Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1043 (1988); Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. 333, 364 (1987); see also Crampton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. Legal Educ.
509, 513 n.l3 (1987); Goldstein, Once Again, "Billy Budd" Is Standing Trial, N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1988, § 2, at 9, col. 3; Chambers, Literature and the Law: A Perfect Fit, Nat'l L. J.,
July 25, 1988, at 13-14.
However, many in the law schools are still at best disturbed by law and literature or at
worst ignorantly indifferent to it. The latter group, the "trashers" or the parochialists, seem to
have been forced by events to go on the defensive. Law, as we teach it, law as it is practiced,
needs the invigoration of imaginative literature to reassert its primacy in the culture. If that is
not the case, the narrowness, the ethical relativism, the utter blandness of vision and rhetoric
pervasive in the field today will continue.
Lawyers without literature are lawyers without a stabilizing, normative sense of them
selves. This fact, recognized by western cultures from the Jews and Romans until, as Robert
Ferguson states, the fourth decade of the 19th century in America, has been lost to us. See R.
Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture 5 (1984). The results range from the insipid
ness of our legal prose these days to the enormity of legalistic wrongdoing in Watergate, on
Wall Street, and even in the decisions of some lower federal courts. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt,
805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876
(1988).
See R. Weisberg, supra note 13, at 210, 297-317 (bibliography).
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to adjudication. Let the literary volumes inform and interact with the
volume of yourself.^®
Here is my proposed annotated reading list. Each work on it is
delightful, but each will force you to examine your judicial values, to
evaluate your passions, to refine your intuitions. November is month
one in the renewed story of yourself.
NOVEMBER. John Barth, The Floating Opera. We begin with
a short and riotously funny novel, Barth's first. It is about a Mary
land lawyer, Todd Andrews, and his dealings with his father, his cli
ents, his mistress, and the judges of the state. The centerpiece of the
story is a complicated wills case involving an eccentric testator whose
38 Law and literature theory has increasingly moved toward the literary text itself and, to
some extent, away from the debate on interpretation that has characterized it for the past halfdecade.
Why the turn to text? Clifford Geertz has said that it helps lawyers to "imagin[e] the
real." M. Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 8 (1987) (citing C. Geertz, Local
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 175 (1983)). And reality, as litera
ture observes perhaps most persuasively, is only partly a verbal or even a hermeneutic phe
nomenon. It includes everything that fiction teaches us and that touches our practice, our
values, and our lives. Thus where those like Ronald Dworkln have, in Law's Empire, supra
note 2, made an identity between law and interpretation, those interested in texts tend to see
law more broadly. Learning from fictional utterances, scholars turning to texts see law as
irrational, more concerned with people's values—with the basic urge to power or to self-preser
vation—than it is with the verbal act alone. These thinkers understand that law is primarily
image, structure, and myth. They seek fiction, somewhat paradoxically, not for its verbal com
plexity but instead for its deeply irrational hold on our imagination. As wonderful as fictional
models are for the legal rhetorician, they come to prominence instead for their non-verbal
aspects. Law, in this view, always includes a substantial component of the structural, mythic,
and pre-verbal wisdom and fears of a society; unless we grasp these and recognize their inevita
ble place in law, we risk being overwhelmed.
Paul Gewirtz, in a recent Harvard Law Review, puts it this way:
Practitioners of "law and literature," a newly fashionable area of legal scholarship,
are rarely concerned with literature at all . . . [seeking rather] to apply current
theories about interpreting literary texts to the judicial enterprise of interpreting
legal texts ... I am more interested, though, in efforts to augment the "law and
literature" movement with work that explores the relevance to law of literature
itself. . . .
Gewirtz, supra note 36, at 1043. Gewirtz gives method to his madness, and provocatively
analyzes the Oresteia to perceive truths otherwise unavailable to lawyers outside of their own
personalized spheres: that "passion is seen as a central, necessary element of law; and [that]
law is presented as a gendered phenomenon." Id. at 1044. Gewirtz recognizes, perhaps partic
ularly in our culturally impoverished times, that fictional texts about law fill a void in the
lawyer's knowledge of his or her everyday pursuits. Lengthy discussions of Aeschylus belong
in the Harvard Law Review because such texts are not fungible into any other approach to
law. They are instead irreducible sources of law. I have long argued this point, suggesting that
certain texts surely teach us more about the realities of law than can be learned anywhere else.
See R. Weisberg, The Failure of the Word, chs. 8-9 (1984); Weisberg, How Judges Speak:
Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor With an Application to Justice Rehnquist,
57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1982); see also West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reserva
tions About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203 (1987) (discussing
whether adjudication is an interpretive act).
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scatological contingent bequest challenges both the surrogate to con
strue it and the parties to abide by it. There is also an automobile
accident case described knowledgeably as to both torts and civil pro
cedure by the brilliant John Barth. But the tale's chief contribution is
its recognition that nihilism, or at least radical relativism, constrains
all lawyers and judges today to re-evaluate the law's underlying
premises.
DECEMBER. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice. Perhaps
the single work of literature rnost frequently cited by lawyers, this
play has always attracted judges, including (as we have seen)^' those
who work in New York's civil court system. Portia's lovely speeches
about mercy are fittingly read during the Christmas season. But
Shakespeare forces us to see, through the nobility of Shylock's stand
for justice and simple acceptance of the legalistic cruelty finally thrust
upon him, that Portia's system is not necessarily the better one.
JANUARY. Dickens, Bleak House. The cold winter nights in
vite a longer read, and who better than Dickens to entertain us? Al
ways fascinated and repulsed by law, Dickens in this work describes
the endless chancery action of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. In the process, a
dozen comic and more serious lawyers and judges are introduced,
from the clerk Guppy (who makes sure his marriage proposal to Es
ther Summerson is made "without prejudice") to the demonic and
powerful Mr. Tulkinghom, to the Chancellor himself. Bleak House
stands as one of the most powerful condemnations of a legal system
designed to create business for itself, one in which form has totally
swallowed up all dynamic notions of justice.
FEBRUARY. Shakespeare, Measure for Measure. Angelo has
been placed in charge of the criminal justice system in Vienna. He
begins to try lovers for the crime of "fornication," one that has been
on the books but unenforced for years. He will not listen to pleas for
mercy, even after he himself falls desperately in love with the chaste
Isabella and urges her to the very act for which others may hang.
Shakespeare not only teaches us about victimless crimes and about
hypocrisy here but also about the dangers of delegating judicial duties
to others who may be unprepared or untrained to exercise them.
MARCH. E.L. Doctorow, The Book of Daniel. This masterful
rendition of the Rosenberg spy case should be read by all judges.
Among Doctorow's first works, it tells the story from the perspective
of Daniel, one of the accused couple's children. A detailed fictional
trial scene captures the passions of judges as well as the stratagems of
39 See supra text accompanying notes 33 & 34.
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lawyers. As Doctorow, through Daniel, sees it, an entire legal system
can become embroiled in its own political passions and then, in the
name of objective law, ignore the reality of those it has come to judge.
APRIL. Harper Lee, To Kill A Mockingbird. One of fiction's
most sympathetic lawyers, Atticus Finch finds himself defending a
black man against a false charge of rape. The relationship of commu
nity values to justice, in part conveyed by the judge in the trial, again
indicates that law's rational forms often mask and thus further the
unbridled passions of those in power. Read together with this shorter
novel, Katherine Anne Porter's marvelous story "Noon Wine" ex
plores the intuitive nature of justice and the puzzling futility of law
within a small community.
MAY. Kafka, The Trial. Perhaps the most representative of all
twentieth-century works, this novel is deliberately set in the bizarre
law courts of Kafka's darkest imagination. Judges sometimes forget
what even more benign systems look like to those outsiders who must
occasionally confront the law. This work adds a chapter to the book
of the self about seeing law as others see it.
JUNE. Faulkner, The Hamlet. One of Faulkner's lighter works,
this book features his favorite fictional lawyer, Gavin Stevens. Ste
vens runs into the wily parvenu, Flem Snopes, and their battle of wits
extends to the courthouse and the boudoir. Faulkner indicates that
gritty common sense has its place in law and love, and that words
alone, if divorced from vitalistic experience, sometimes fall short of
grasping essential realities.
JULY. Scott Turow, Presumed Innocent. As long as this is not
the first book on such a list, it is certainly acceptable as a vacation
"read." Turow takes us into big city legal politics, his protagonist an
assistant D.A. investigating a brutal crime. There are innumerable
twists, turns, and surprises, and there is also an excellent portrait of a
black judge, the dynamic and passionate Judge Larren Lyttle.
AUGUST. Camus, The Fall. This masterpiece of postwar
French fiction tells the story of Jean-Baptiste Clamence, a self-exiled
Parisian lawyer now in watery Amsterdam. His personal fall matches
that of European culture itself; his years during Vichy and the Nazi
occupation of France are testimony to the evil that intellectuals do by
remaining silent (or even gently contributing to the "debate") when
the beast has entered the courts of law.
SEPTEMBER. Sophocles, Antigone; Aeschylus, The Eumenides; the Bible, 1 Kings, chapter 3. These three short, foundational
texts will link the self to our culture's basic sense of justice. In Antig
one, a brave young woman fights to maintain her natural sense of
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right as against Creon's cruel dictates of power-backed law; in The
Eumenides, Athena establishes trial by jury to resolve a dispute be
tween Orestes and the Furies; and in 1 Kings, the greatest judge of
all—Solomon—teaches us that judging is far more than logic, empiri
cism, or economics.
OCTOBER. Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor. The most centrally
important work about law, this short story tells of Captain Vere's di
lemma in adjudicating the case of the morally innocent foretopman,
Billy Budd. The easygoing, popular, and forthright sailor has struck
and killed the evil master-at-arms, John Claggart, just as Claggart was
falsely accusing him of mutiny. "Struck dead by an angel of God,"
intones the agitated witness to the deed. Captain Vere himself. "Yet
the angel must hang!" This peculiar prophecy sets the stage for a trial
at sea, and for a judgment not so much about Billy as about Vere, the
captain-tumed-adjudicator.
Once finished this cycle, the judge will want to repeat it, using
other books in the next twelve-month period. For the self is always
there, whether we admit it or not. Our choice is to leave it gathering
dust—at a great cost to our judicial system—or to place it always in
the company of those people or things that can challenge it to be its
best. The least result of this education into the self is the awareness
that judges cannot remove themselves from the adjudicatory
equation.
Cardozo's "values," Brennan's "passion," Weisberg's "self on
the shelf." However it is put, this personal side to judging must be
recognized and, I believe, embraced. But accepting that part of the
judge's task with gusto only begins the risk-fraught process of recog
nizing who you are and what you have to do.

